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In the contemporary global economy, new technologies are growing the ‘reserve army’ of 
labour, while the wage-system is becoming increasingly unable to meet workers’ ‘basic 
needs’. Bernstein’s concept of ‘classes of labour’ refers to the growing proportion of the 
world’s population that is now compelled to reproduce itself through various forms of petty 
production, and wage-labour that is increasingly scarce, informal and precarious. Rather than 
more ‘visible’ locations in global production networks, this paper focuses on the under-
researched majority of labourers who have little structural or associational power. Drawing on 
fieldwork in India, the paper seeks out the social, spatial and temporal forms of labour’s 
collective action by analysing spatial patterns of reproduction and forms of control. Inflected 
with the agency of both capital and labour, these ‘local labour control regimes’ are shown to 
vary across two contrasting ‘reproduction zones’: a commuting zone that links villages to 
nearby cities, and a circulation zone that links remote villages to a distant city. The paper 
analyses how collective action varies across the two ‘zones’, and considers the possibilities 
for scaling up, consolidating and extending class struggle.  
 
 
Introduction: Bringing Politics into Classes of Labour 
In India, as elsewhere, the appropriation of land to extract raw materials for capitalist 
production, or territory for SEZs and other sites of industrial and tertiary production, has 
intensified (Borras et al. 2011; Levien 2011; Milne 2015). At the same time the dynamics of 
competitive accumulation and technological change are reducing levels of wage-labour (eg. 
Harriss et al. 2011). As rising underemployment grows the ‘surplus population’ (Marx 1976 
[1867], 783), the bases of material reproduction become more spatially and temporally 
fragmented – especially for those who remain rooted in the countryside while commuting, 
migrating, and circulating for work (eg. Breman 1996; Swider 2015).  
 
Most of India’s more than 100 million migrants in 2016 were circular migrants (GoI 2017, 
267), while millions commuted to work in nearby towns and cities. Around two-thirds of the 
rural-based population are landless or have marginal landholdings that are insufficient for 
material reproduction (GoI NSS 2013, 73; Pattenden 2016). Construction, the largest 
absorber of agricultural labour in India (Srivastava 2012, 76), will shed jobs as new 
technologies are developed, and older ones become more widespread.2 Along with the 
scattering of wage-work across sites and sectors (fragmentation in the sphere of production) 
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2 For example large ready-mix cement trucks are reducing demand for concrete pourers.  
comes a greater separation of workplaces from homeplaces (the spheres of production and 
reproduction).  
 
These evolving dynamics of material reproduction raise questions about the politics of class 
relations and possible routes to improving labour’s conditions through collective action – 
questions that centre on the relationship between the ‘structural power’ that may be drawn 
from workers’ locations in the economic system, and the ‘associational power’ that may be 
derived through workers’ collective action (Silver 2003, 13; Wright 2000). This paper seeks 
to develop a framework for identifying the structural and associational power of the many 
Indian labourers whose material reproduction combines a continuing dependence on the 
agrarian (petty production and wage-labour) with non-agricultural work that is scarce, 
informal and precarious. Such workers are members of exploited classes who live and work 
in villages, commute, and circulate for work either seasonally or for years at a time.3 They are 
hard to organise and mobilise because of their greater spatial fragmentation across worksites, 
and widespread recruitment and organisation by labour intermediaries, which often renders 
vertical ties stronger than horizontal ones. Their frequent combination of wage-labour with 
various forms of petty self-employment can also undermine shared bases for collective 
action.  
 
Bernstein’s (2006, 455) term ‘classes of labour’ captures the fragmentation of labour across 
multiple sites of reproduction (‘urban and rural, agricultural and non-agricultural wage 
employment and self-employment’), and is also concerned with fragmentation along lines of 
‘generation, gender, caste and ethnicity’.4 It points to the coexistence of exploitation and 
domination through insecure, informal and oppressive forms of reproduction. It underlines 
that in many places wage-labour is becoming increasingly scarce, growing the ‘surplus 
population’ and ‘disciplin[ing] and disempower[ing] those in work’ (Harriss-White 2005, 
1243). And, in its reference to informality, it indicates the state’s tendency to mediate labour 
relations in capital’s favour. In other words it sketches the key impediments to classes of 
labour’s structural and associational power. And yet it also indicates labour’s potential 
political power by highlighting ‘the growing numbers of those who ‘depend – directly and 
indirectly – on the sale of their labour power for their own reproduction’ (Panitch and Leys 
2001, x cited in Bernstein 2006, 455), and who therefore share a position as members of the 
exploited classes. Although many members of classes of labour engage in forms of self-
employment, including farming, their households cannot reproduce themselves without 
wage-labour and are all net sellers of labour-power.5 This, despite the changing and complex 
lived experiences of fragmented processes of reproduction, suggests that it is as wage-
labourers that classes of labour are most likely to act collectively in their interests.  
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The term classes of labour, then, sketches various facets of fragmentation and political 
subordination, while indicating potential associational power. In order to deploy the term 
politically, classes of labour need to be analysed in actual social settings that draw out, for 
example, the co-constitution of class, caste and ethnicity (see, for example, Lerche and Shah, 
this volume), or gender, caste and class (Kapadia 1995). The broader literature on labour in 
an era of ‘globalisation’ and neoliberalism has pointed out how informality undermines the 
ability to mobilise in relation to the state, how precarity undermines the ability to mobilise in 
the workplace, and how recruitment through intermediaries undermines both (eg. Barrientos 
2013).6 A countervailing recent literature on labour agency is skewed towards those workers 
who are integrated into global production networks in ways that accord them relatively more 
structural power, such as some of those supplying companies like Apple and high-street 
clothing stores (Brookes 2017; Zajak 2017), where international union and NGO networks 
have been able to exert some pressure through solidarity actions and/or the use of such 
mechanisms as core labour standards and international framework agreements (eg. Merk 
2009).7  
 
This paper draws on fieldwork data on members of classes of labour in the Indian state of 
Karnataka, of which over eighty per cent primarily make a living as wage-labourers - mostly 
in the agriculture and construction sectors (see below for details). As agricultural labourers 
they are scattered across remote fields working either individually or in small gangs for petty 
capitalists who exert various forms of control over them.8 As construction workers, with the 
exception of times when they have worked on a high-profile SEZ, they experience a highly 
fragmented labour process and frequent movement between worksites. In the words of a 
prominent south Indian construction union organiser, while ‘in most sectors the product 
moves and the workers stay where they are, in construction the product stays where it is and 
the workers move’ (interview, Chennai, May 2016). Construction workers are, then, not only 
more spatially fragmented, but there is also a temporal disjuncture between the labour 
process and the accumulation process, which undermines leverage. Accumulation takes place 
before workers arrive (through the appropriation of land), and after they have left - when the 
office blocks are occupied and the apartments are sold. Across India 97 per cent of 
construction work is informal (Srivastava and Jha 2016, 12),9 and over 90 per cent of workers 
are unorganised.10 
 
In some contexts land is the primary issue for India’s classes of labour - among, for example, 
those displaced by mining projects in the ‘red corridor’ that fans out north-eastwards from 
central India. More generally, retaining land is an issue for those with marginal landholdings 
due to its material, symbolic and socio-political value, but in most of India the capacity for 
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land reform is limited to levels that will not meet the full costs of reproduction (Rawal 2008). 
Some small farmers joined the high-profile farmers’ organisations of the 1980s and 1990s, 
but found their interests marginalised because the movements were led by the capitalist 
farmers who dominated and exploited them (Banaji 1994; Pattenden 2005). It will be argued 
here that the central political questions for India’s classes of labour are focused on their role 
as wage-labourers – all depend on wage-labour (at least in part) to reproduce themselves, and 
many (a clear majority in this paper’s fieldwork areas) primarily reproduce themselves 
through wage-labour. What, then, are the terms and levels of access to wage-labour, and how 
can classes of labour’s material and political position be improved in a way that is not only 
sustainable in the face of counter-moves by capital, but which could lead towards more 
fundamental change?  
 
The paper focuses on the fragmentation of labour in and around the workplace, and the 
mediation of the capital-labour relation by various types of contractors, which often has 
pivotal and contradictory impacts on associational power – dialectically-shaped differences 
that generate variations in experience and thinking that influence patterns of unity and 
division across workplace and living space. In addition, the paper discusses elements of state 
mediation of the capital-labour relation, outlines the role played by (pro) labour 
organisations, and touches on the characteristics of capitalists (levels of unity, and capacity to 
shape state processes and fragment labour). In other words it draws out variations in worker 
and capitalist unity (at the level of sites, sectors and networks); patterns and degrees of labour 
and capital’s dependence on one another across time and place; the vulnerability of capital to 
loss of reputation/profit/market-share; and the state’s contradictory mediation of the capital-
labour relation: although fundamentally aligned with the interests of capital, it sometimes 
offers possibilities for labour to make material and political gains. 
 
In order to deploy the term classes of labour politically, then, there is a need to analyse the 
diversity of ‘concrete’ capital-labour relations experienced by classes of labour. Such an 
attempt to pin down how and why the structural and associational power of precarious, 
informal and relatively invisible classes of labour varies across sites of production and 
reproduction requires the deployment of two further terms: local labour control regimes and 
reproduction zones.  
 
Local Labour Control Regimes 
If the term classes of labour points towards potential bases of unity among diverse processes 
of material reproduction, the terms local labour control regime and reproduction zone help to 
provide a framework for increasing understanding of who among informal classes of labour 
might mobilise, where, when, and how. Building on discussion in a previous paper 
(Pattenden 2016b), local labour control regimes (LLCRs) are understood here as an 
expression of class struggle in a particular place, and at a particular time. They centre on the 
relationship between simple and expanded reproduction in a particular place (how labourers 
make a living and how capitalists accumulate), which shapes geographies of dependence, and 
forms and degrees of exploitation and control (including rates of surplus value extraction and 
the degradation of human bodies (Marx 1976, 353)). LLCRs also encompass the ways in 
which a locality’s economic activities are positioned in broader national and international 
markets (dynamics of competitive accumulation, and the capital-labour relation in general),11 
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and institutional mediations by socially produced actors such as the state (see also Burawoy 
1985). These affect geographies of accumulation and reproduction (through the construction 
of irrigation canals or roads for example), the appropriation and distribution of resources, and 
the (non-)regulation of the capital-labour relation. 
 
Inflected with the agency of capital and labour, LLCRs represent the concretisation of intra- 
and inter-class relations. Under capitalism these relations render capital ascendant (hence 
‘control'), but to varying degrees – hence the need to analyse ‘local’ variations in order to 
map the distribution of structural and associational power. Burawoy’s (1985, 88) typology of 
factory regimes, which were characterised by ‘the labour process, market competition among 
firms, the reproduction of labour power, and state intervention’, facilitated such a mapping – 
showing, for example, how the geography of collective action in early twentieth century 
Russia was shaped by the different ways in which spatial dynamics of production, 
reproduction, location in markets, and state intervention played out across St Petersburg and 
Moscow (102-113). While factory regimes combined analysis of the ‘political effects of the 
labour process’ and the ‘institutions that regulate and shape struggles in the workplace’ (87), 
LLCRs represent an attempt to respond to increased spatial fragmentation of sites of 
reproduction by foregrounding the predominant forms of the capital-labour relation across 
particular villages and urban localities. 
 
Reproduction Zones 
Local labour control regimes vary in form across reproduction zones. As reproduction 
becomes more multi-sited, the spatial disaggregation of LLCRs becomes increasingly 
necessary in order to facilitate the search for moments and locations of greater structural 
power, and possible transitions to associational power and political change. The term 
‘reproduction zone’ underlines the dynamism of labourers’ structural power, denoting all of 
the places where a household lives and works, as well as their broader world-historical 
locations. Analysing LLCRs across reproduction zones helps to outline how labourers’ socio-
political position changes as they move across living spaces and worksites that are 
differentially located in relation to more specific and more general forms of the capital-labour 
relation (encompassing, in other words, particular production sites and their location in the 
world-historical economy), intra-class relations (especially patterns of social and spatial 
fragmentation and unity), and in terms of their mediation by socially produced collective 
actors – primarily the state.  
 
If material reproduction is increasingly fragmented both spatially and temporally then it 
follows that class struggle cannot be imagined in terms of single locations, issues or fronts, 
but in relation to ‘reproduction zones’ as a whole. The forms that such struggles take are 
likely to reflect the spatial and temporal fragmentation of labour’s reproduction by being 
more fluid, episodic and multi-sited.  
 
In her vivid ethnography of construction workers in Beijing, Swider (2015) shows the 
interplay between workplace control, the spatial dynamics of production and reproduction, 
and the varying and uneven forms of collective action by migrant construction workers. 
Those living in the ‘city of walls’ work on large building sites populated by male migrant 
construction workers managed by sub-contractors, and divided by task and place of origin. 
They live in on-site dormitories, which facilitates tighter control and a lengthening of the 
working day. At the same time workers are constantly engaged in ‘everyday’ forms of class 
struggle (Scott 1985). They restrict work intensity by footdragging, engage in acts of theft 
and sabotage, and physically rein in abusive contractors. They also use time crunches to press 
claims over conditions, and when wages have gone unpaid workers have occupied cranes and 
threatened suicide. These dramatic protests are fast-tracked through social media to increase 
leverage on reputation-sensitive employers. Such actions are short-lived but widespread. 
They are also collectively planned and executed, and hard to counter because, unlike drawn-
out site or sector-based union campaigns, the organisation involved cannot be co-opted. As 
worker Li put it ‘if there is no hand, the glove does not work’ (Swider 2015, 122).  
 
In order to better understand such forms of action, there is a need to analyse entire zones of 
reproduction because as workers move between sites their structural power varies. This may 
be manifested in moves between ‘everyday’ and overt forms of worker ‘agency’ (concrete 
acts by workers in their individual or collective interest), or between hidden and public 
transcripts (Scott 1990). A greater prevalence of ‘public transcripts’ through which workers 
openly articulate their views indicates a shift from a latent potential for action by virtue of 
objective conditions and shared experiences of domination and exploitation, towards concrete 
collective action (eg. Pattenden 2016, 83).  
 
Class Struggle 
Despite a relative absence of structural power, classes of labour do act collectively at times, 12 
and, it will be argued, increasingly through spatial and temporal forms that are different from 
the sustained place-based mobilisations that still fill the left’s imagining of labouring class 
mobilisation. As a location of struggle, production sites have not necessarily become less 
important because the material reproduction of the labouring class has been stretched 
spatially and temporally. Instead the workplace is integrated into class struggle through 
different spatial and temporal forms. This is not to deny that there has been some 
displacement of struggles from workplace to living space, which is also part of the capital-
labour relation writ large (see below), or that there is a need to expand the focus on the 
appropriation of nature (Baglioni and Campling 2017; Moore 2015), and the sphere of 
reproduction (Mezzadri 2016). 
 
Class struggle is ever-present in capitalist society: in terms of who can access and control 
natural resources and appropriate its uses; in the sphere of reproduction over the time and 
energy spent (mostly by women) in preparing and restoring labour’s capacity to be exploited; 
in the sphere of production over the intensity and length of necessary and surplus labour time; 
in the sphere of circulation of money and commodities (up to  the moment of consumption) 
over the appropriation of surplus-value before and after the production process; and in terms 
of how the state accrues and distributes revenues based on natural resources and the 
extraction of surplus value.  
 
Perpetually present, class struggle has a continuum of forms. At one end are the non-
confrontational ‘everyday’ acts that negotiate the margins of surplus-value extraction and the 
management of domination - such as petty theft, foot-dragging, and the shaping of public and 
hidden transcripts. At the other are varieties of sustained overt mass actions, and in between a 
variety of hybrid and changing forms. And, in addition to the main protagonists, a range of 
contemporary and historical actors mediate the dynamics to different degrees. As well as a 
variety of forms, class struggle encompasses different scales, and spatial and temporal 
patterns. Spatial patterns span from the highly localised to the globally networked, and from 
networks that coordinate struggles across place to networks that coordinate struggles in 
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particular places. Temporal forms extend from sustained bouts of struggle to episodes and 
moments that recur with varying degrees of frequency.  
 
This schematic list matters when analysing the political and material position of informal 
labourers with relatively little structural power. These workers are not located in parts of the 
world economy where capital is made relatively vulnerable by virtue of restricted access to 
raw materials, the nature of its production sequence, especially time-sensitive integration into 
commodity circuits, or because high street prominence makes it reputation-sensitive. This is a 
paper about places where the particular forms of capital-labour relations leave labour 
particularly vulnerable; where a labour-centred development is as elusive as it is necessary.  
 
This is a conundrum of labour-centred development (Selwyn 2014). Most informal labourers 
are located within the (social) relations of production in ways that usually militate against 
open collective forms of collective struggle, particularly in its more direct forms. As a rule, 
the worse that labour’s material and political conditions are, the harder it is affect a labour-
centred development, and the more urgent the analysis of local labour control regimes and 
reproduction zones becomes. 
 
Methodology and Reproduction Zones 
The paper draws on recent and long-term fieldwork in two south Indian districts and the city 
of Bangalore (see map). Fieldwork was first conducted in Dharwad district in 2002, and at 
various intervals since – most recently in August 2017. Additional interviews and surveys 
were conducted in 2008, 2010, 2013, and 2014 (further details of earlier research can be 
found in Pattenden 2016). Fieldwork was first conducted in Raichur district in 2007, and 
interviews and surveys of particular hamlets/villages were carried out in 2007, 2008, 2010, 
2011 and 2014. In 2016 and 2017 additional interviews were carried out in two villages 
(Kamlapur in the commuting zone and Jagalwara in the circulation zone), in Bangalore 
offices, building sites, a colony of concrete workers (Yadgir colony), and an informal 
settlement populated by migrant construction workers. Interviews were conducted with 
helpers, masons, various types of ‘maistries’ (subcontractors,13 small-scale labour 
contractors, and petty capitalist small building contractors), house owners, a Building 
Company Managing Director, NGOs, union activists, and labour department officials. The 
initial research was ethnographic, and some of the recent fieldwork involved discussions with 
long-term key informants. The paper’s recent empirical basis is, though, relatively limited, 
and its primary purpose is to contribute methodologically to the study of the politics of 
classes of labour. 
 
The paper compares two reproduction zones of classes of labour (see Map). Both have two 
main sites of wage-labour (the village and the city), and in both cases the major sectors are 
agriculture and construction. Waves of mechanisation, shifts in cropping patterns, droughts 
and falling water tables have reduced the availability of wage-employment. As of 2014 the 
use of combine harvesters, long established in wetland villages, was slowly becoming more 
widespread in the dryland villages in the commuting zone. Transplantation machines, which 
would displace the single largest source of female agricultural labour in wetland villages, 
were being trialled.  
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The two reproduction zones are distinct in various respects including distances between home 
villages and urban worksites, and levels of economic dependence on the village (see Table 1). 
The first zone is a commuting zone that encompasses the medium-sized city of Dharwad and 
nearby dryland villages. The closer villages are more tightly integrated into the urban 
economy, as are those with poorer soils, which tend to reduce agricultural profitability and 
foster diversification of the bases of simple and expanded reproduction (how labourers make 
a living and how capitalists accumulate). In Kamlapur village most male labourers commuted 
to the city to work on small construction projects, while most female labourers remained in 
the village as agricultural labourers. Less than fifteen per cent of households belonging to 
classes of labour primarily made a living through petty commodity production (see Table 1). 
Most primarily made their living through informal urban wage-labour,14 and were largely 
economically independent of the village. This had eroded the power of dominant caste 
landowners, although they retained disproportionate influence over village councils.  
 
The more remote circulation zone centres on villages in southern Raichur district – part of a 
larger region with high levels of migration to the distant city of Bangalore. The circulation 
zone had higher levels of irrigation, greater agricultural profitability, and more marked forms 
of control over labour – evidenced by greater levels of ‘indebtedness’ to farmers, and more 
cases of bonded labour (see Pattenden 2016 for a more detailed account). As in the 
commuting zone village, most households primarily made a living through informal wage-
labour, although here it was mostly as agricultural labourers (see Table 1).15 Mechanisation 
and drought increased migration to Bangalore’s building sites in the early 2000s. All or part 
of most labouring households have migrated at some point, with some migrating seasonally, 
but most (especially the landless) migrating for a number of years, with occasional visits 
home. Construction workers circulating to Bangalore were more tightly controlled at the 
workplace than those in the commuting zone because they were further from home, and more 
restricted to particular sites.  
 
Table 1 Primary Bases of Reproduction of Households belonging to Classes of Labour in the 
two Reproduction Zones (source: fieldwork data) 
 
Percentage of households 
primarily reproduced through: 
Commuting Zone 
(dryland), 
≈10 km from the city. 
Circulation Zone  
(part canal-irrigated), 
>400 km from the city. 
Informal wage-labour 82 84.9 
Petty farming and livestock-
rearing 
14 13.4 
Agricultural wage-labour 25 61.9 
Urban wage-labour 59 22.4 
Construction wage-labour 50 22.4 
                                                     
14 More precisely, of around the two thirds of households that belonged to classes of labour in 2014, 
only 14 per cent made a living through petty agriculture and livestock-rearing, while 82 per cent did 
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per cent of the predominantly wage-labouring households primarily made a living as agricultural 
wage-labourers in their own and nearby villages, while 27 per cent primarily did so as construction 
labourers in distant Bangalore.  
Fragmentation, Management and Mediation 
The remainder of the paper compares the zones primarily in terms of three key aspects of 
local labour control regimes: fragmentation, management, and mediation by the state.16 With 
regard to the first of these, classes of labour were not only spatially fragmented across cities 
and villages, they were also fragmented within the various production sites across their 
reproduction zones (by gender, task, experience, wage etc.). Within agriculture tasks were 
divided by gender (women put and pull things from the earth, while men spray, operate 
machinery and steer oxen), and carried out individually or in groups. In construction, 
meanwhile, women remained in ‘unskilled’ positions, were paid around one third less than 
men for equivalent work, and managed by men. Sexual harassment was endemic, and 
resistance was often punished with heavier loads.  
 
Construction labour is fragmented horizontally as well as vertically. While wall construction, 
plastering and concrete curing is done by core workers who remain on site for the duration of 
a project, excavation (usually now done by JCB), ‘centreing’ (temporary internal 
scaffolding), bar-bending, and concrete pouring are all-subcontracted along with electrical 
and plumbing work, tiling, glazing and painting. Across the two zones it will be shown that 
the skilled masons in the commuting zone had the greatest amount of structural power 
because they were the least economically dependent on their villages and the most depended 
upon by their maistries – a term applied to piece-rate gang leaders in agriculture, and a 
variety of labour intermediaries in construction including labour contractors, petty capitalist 
contractors, and subcontractors. 17 
 
The second element of LLCRs discussed here concerns the type of maistry managing labour, 
and how this shapes integration into the broader production process. Maistries are often 
critical to labour’s capacity to act collectively, depending on whether they are closer to labour 
or capital (in terms of interests, dependence, and socially), and whether they are petty 
capitalists or managers-cum-workers. There were two main types of construction maistries in 
the fieldwork sites: petty capitalist contractor maistries who take care of materials as well as 
labour (and whose profits rise with the intensity of work and the lowering of wages), and 
labour maistries who take a cut of the wages of the labourers that they deploy, but who are 
also wage-earners and broadly aligned with the workers that they manage and occasionally 
work alongside. The distinction is critical for class position (Van der Loop 1996), their 
relationship to workers, and their location within class struggle (Wetlesen 2016). Across the 
two zones it will be shown that labour contractors on larger Bangalore sites run by more 
reputation-sensitive capitalists were best-placed to organise collectively.  
 
The third aspect of LLCRs focused on here is their mediation by the state and pro-labour 
organisations. State interventions will primarily be discussed in relation to the homeplace-
based provisions of the village council and the workplace-based provisions of the Buildings 
and other Construction Workers Welfare Board, which was also the primary focus of unions 
and pro-labour NGOs. It will be shown that the Welfare Board was the most likely site of 
collective action in the commuting zone, while the village council was the most likely in the 
circulation zone.  
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17 Subcontractors may be higher-paid labourers or petty capitalists depending on scale of operation, 
ownership of machinery etc. 
Local Labour Control Regimes in the Commuting Zone. 
In the commuting zone village, most male labourers worked on construction projects in a 
nearby city. Agricultural labour was now largely done by women, and increasing control over 
female labourers was shown by their very low wages - still only 100 rupees per day in 2017, 
which was lower than wages in the circulation zone, and around two and a half times less 
than those earned by female construction workers. Commuting male  construction workers 
worked mostly on small building projects (houses and small commercial developments) as 
core building labourers. They were divided almost equally between masons and helpers, and 
often organised into small tight sub-groups of four or six. Across the commuting zone 
workers were usually drawn from the maistry’s home and nearby villages through kinship 
and other networks, and typically worked for the same maistry for years – particularly the 
more skilled among them. Meanwhile, concreting and other subcontracting gangs were 
mostly made up of workers who lived in the city. 
 
While it seemed at first that core workers were divided between ‘skilled’ masons and 
‘unskilled’ workers, there was in fact more of a continuum. There were more and less skilled 
masons and helpers, and ‘second circle’ masons who got work less regularly. Then there 
were helpers who moved between maistries, and irregular unskilled helpers who worked in 
the sector seasonally or when drought pushed them out of the fields. The most desperate 
waited at one of two labour markets in Dharwad city. Those from more distant villages had 
less bargaining power as they had already invested more time and money in getting there.  
 
Different types of construction workers responded in very different ways when asked about 
the potential for collective action to demand better conditions, higher wages or greater access 
to social security. One type stood out through qualitatively different responses that underlined 
that they were the most likely to mobilise: the more experienced and skilled masons that 
maistries depended upon as the lynchpins of the labour process, particularly in the latter 
stages of house construction when the finer details were executed.  
 
More experienced masons strategized and acted collectively to push up wages when the cost 
of living rose. They would take it in turns to tell the maistry about small wage increases on 
other sites. If that did not work then they might force the maistry’s hand by floating the idea 
of going to work elsewhere. Such informal wage bargaining was, though, linked to periods of 
marked inflation rather than to pushing up real wages.  
 
The relaxed way in which regularly employed experienced masons spoke about their work 
was telling, and in marked contrast to a younger ‘second circle’ mason who said that if he 
asked for a pay rise he would be ‘told to take a holiday’. Helpers were equally circumspect. 
They faced greater competition for work, and were relatively easy to replace. Among 
construction workers, then, the lower levels of precarity provided by higher skill levels were 
central to structural and informal associational power. Such forms of power were, though, 
held in check by broader structures.   
 
The type of maistries that skilled masons worked for shaped their ability to act collectively. 
There were eight construction maistries in Kamlapur village – four petty capitalist 
contractors, and four labour contractors. The latter supplied small teams of masons and 
helpers to small house-building sites and commercial developments operated by engineers-
cum-contractors. Although broadly aligned with labour their positionality was complicated 
by dependence on the capitalist engineers-cum-contractors who they generally worked for on 
a long-term basis. Relationships were relatively personalised, and in some cases engineers 
provided labour contractors with ‘gifts’ to garner loyalty and intensify the labour process. 
Those working under these labour maistries were in a more precarious position and unlikely 
to rock boats.  
 
Those working for the village-based petty capitalist contractors who worked directly for 
house-owners in the city were in a somewhat stronger position, but even they would be 
reluctant to move against those that they depended on for work. Besides sporadic pushes for 
wage increases, they would need to work with petty contractors rather than against them in 
order to improve the terms of building contracts, but the constraints faced by petty 
contractors pushed them towards state-oriented forms of action.  
 
The balance of power between petty contractor and owner was more skewed where the 
former was less well-established (see also De Neve 2014). House owners sometimes delayed 
payments and pushed up costs with last-minute demands. One petty contractor from 
Kamlapur related how the initial estimate of the costs of a housebuilding project was done in 
an office where people ‘write fast’, and that he had no basis for renegotiating when owners 
added in time-consuming details in the latter stages of a build, which, like delayed payments, 
pushed down his income. ‘We cannot read and write’, he said, ‘but we can think and talk’. 
There was no petty contractors’ association to defend his interests, and if there was a dispute 
with an owner he yielded more ground because he feared for his reputation in the relatively 
small market place of a provincial city. Larger and more established contractors could more 
easily absorb losses on one project and make up for them elsewhere, while in Bangalore 
reputations were more easily left behind.  
 
A shift in the balance of power between construction workers and house-owners would 
require not only the unity of those working under particular maistries, but unity among 
maistries - hard to achieve as some would break ranks for the extra jobs that were on offer 
unless there was concerted organisation by unions. So, among the labour contractors and 
petty contractors from Kamlapur village, personalised forms of control, competition, and the 
informality of contractor-owner relations all cut against collective action in different ways. In 
addition labour was fragmented into small groups, as well as being divided between ‘core 
workers’ and an array of subcontracting gangs.  
 
Apart from skilled masons’ informal wage bargaining, the most likely focus of collective 
action were government welfare programmes. Male construction workers had little interest in 
the various programmes run by the village council (housing, employment etc.) because they 
wished to complement their relatively recent economic independence from the village by 
asserting their autonomy from the village’s main political institution, which they saw as the 
domain of  dominant caste landowners. In contrast, female agricultural labourers continued to 
view village-level government institutions as the primary target for claim-making, but were 
hampered by patriarchy and material dependence on farmers.  
 
Relatively cohesive in caste terms, dominant class farmers have used their control over the 
allocation of welfare programmes through village councils to maintain their power and divide 
labour (Pattenden 2016). Rather than village councils, the most likely site of action was the 
workplace-based Building and other Construction Workers Welfare Board, which provided 
such things as compensation for death and disability, and grants for weddings and education. 
Skilled masons knew that the Board had collected millions through cess payments, but did 
not see it as worth the cost of registration because they did not expect the benefits to actually 
be paid after some workers had registered and received nothing. There was a need for a union 
or pro-labour NGO to counter co-option by particular dominant class interests, and prise the 
fund open. Such organisations were active in Bangalore, but not in the smaller city in the 
commuting zone. Were the money to begin to flow, skilled workers would lead the push for 
implementation.  
 
Local Labour Control Regimes in the Circulation Zone 
Local labour control regimes in the circulation zone had three key features. The first was the 
tight form of control exercised over agricultural labour in the home area. The second was the 
varying power of labourers across large and small construction sites in the city – greater on 
the bigger sites from which they were increasingly displaced by larger construction capital’s 
preference for more pliant out-of-state migrants. The third key feature was the distance 
between village and urban worksite, which meant that workers lived in the city for long 
periods, usually in tents located on or near their worksites. This spatial fragmentation and the 
temporary nature of their urban dwelling sites undermined their political position in the city 
and channelled their power into collective moves for greater access to government resources 
in their home village.  
 
Labourers who remained  in the village were primarily engaged in scarce, informal and 
precarious agricultural work and were tightly controlled. There was widespread indebtedness 
to capitalist farmers (Pattenden 2016), who also found ways to control labour working on a 
piece-rate basis. The most significant form of piece-rate wage-labour, paddy transplantation, 
was managed by ‘maistries’ – in this case leaders of work-gangs who negotiate with farmers, 
manage the labour process, and distribute wages. With piece-rate arrangements daily incomes 
increase with the intensity of work, which encourages self-disciplining, shorter breaks and 
the exclusion of slower workers. Farmers exercised control by paying maistries more, lending 
them money, and providing other family members with more days of casual labour. In return 
labourers were dispatched to the fields in a timely fashion, and the gang leader sometimes 
agreed to small extensions of the area to be covered (a concealed reduction of the wage rate). 
In other words, proximity to employers forestalled the possibility of agricultural maistries 
pressing for improved conditions.  
 
Those migrating to the city had had some experience of collective action on worksites. In 
twenty years working on Bangalore’s construction sites, labour contractors from Jagalwara 
village had experienced three moments of collective action – all related to delayed wage 
payments, and all on large building sites run by and for well-known developers and builders. 
On these larger sites in Bangalore, there was some potential for labour subcontractors to 
coordinate collective action because of their greater proximity to labour than capital. Labour 
contractors here were unencumbered by personalised relations with capitalist employers, and 
lived alongside the labourers with whom they shared an interest in maximising wages and 
improving conditions. But labour contractors also indicated the fragility of such forms of 
collective action, alternating during interviews between being bullish about making demands 
about wages and living conditions, and stating that it was better not to ‘make problems’ and 
indicating the difficulties of uniting the various subcontractors.  
 
As well as greater unity between labourers and their immediate managers, larger developers 
and builders are more reputation-sensitive. They do not wish to be found breaching core 
labour standards during a build. Given that clients include world-renowned brands like 
Phillips, they are also potentially vulnerable to such companies not wanting to be associated 
with buildings where core labour standards had been breached - assuming that could be 
shown given that construction workers leave before high-profile tenants move in.  
 
This relative vulnerability has pushed larger builders to increasingly hire out-of-state, mostly 
north Indian, migrant workers over the last decade. They were seen as ‘more reliable’, and 
unencumbered by families that create regulatory headaches around crèches and child labour. 
Of 600 workers manning a large high-end residential development in mid-2017, all were men 
and barely one per cent were in-state workers. In other words on more reputation-sensitive 
sites where construction workers have greater structural power, workers are more likely to be 
from out-of-state and have fewer political resources at their disposal.  
  
The in-state migrants in this paper’s circulation zone had largely moved from high-profile 
large projects for high-end residential developers and office blocks in SEZs, to smaller 
projects where the management structure afforded them less structural power: they were 
more atomised and there was no potential for joint action across subcontractors’ gangs. As a 
rule wages were higher, but the living conditions were worse, the work was harder and the 
hours longer – especially if workers lived on site. Far from home, even the more experienced 
masons indicated a reluctance to make claims. They were loyal to and dependent on their 
maistries (labour contractors) who, in their turn, were dependent on building contractors and 
engineers. As labour’s capacity for collective action grows, then, capital undermines it by 
modifying the way it is integrated into the production process. 
 
Meanwhile settled migrant workers like those in Yadgir colony in south-central Bangalore 
who were more embedded in the city had shifted from being ‘core construction workers’ 
(masons and helpers) to subcontracting work where they moved from site to site on a daily 
basis.18 They competed for jobs rather than cooperating, and made few lasting connections 
with building contractors. Compared to core construction work, the work was less intense and 
less dangerous (particularly for women), the hours shorter, and the wages higher. Greater 
workplace autonomy had increased the scope for collective action, but the highly atomised 
nature of subcontracting work left no scope for it. Recent restrictions on river-sand mining 
and a growing influx of concreting lorries had further intensified competition, pushing 
workers employed by smaller operators into auto-driving and cleaning.  
 
Unlike those who remained in Jagalwara village as agricultural labourers, those returning 
home from Bangalore were emboldened by reduced dependence on village landowners, and 
more likely to act collectively. With the support of a local social movement19 they had made 
claims for National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) work from their village 
councils. In those villages where the balance of power was not too skewed to the dominant 
(generally in villages that were closer to the main roads, and with stronger connections to 
urban labour markets), welfare programmes provided a basis for collective challenges to the 
status quo – in contrast to the commuting zone. However, many labourers continued to 
circulate, and this greater spatial fragmentation undermined momentum. 
 
                                                     
18 These workers, like the Tamil migrants referred to below, had settled in the city and did not intend 
to return home. Although not part of the circulation zone, they were part of what shaped it. Before 
moving into different parts of the construction sector, this earlier wave of migrants had previously 
occupied the small-scale core construction work that those in the circulation zone had now moved 
into. 
19 The Jagruthi Mahela Sanghathan. 
Table 2: Construction workers’ most likely sites of collective action across the reproduction 
zones20 
Location of Construction Labourer Most likely site of collective action 
Commuting Zone, Dharwad Workplace in relation to petty contractors 
(appeals for higher wages); workplace related to 
state programmes (greater access to Welfare 
Board funds). 
Large Sites, Circulation Zone, 
Bangalore  
 
Workplace in relation to large-scale capital (for 
delayed/unpaid wages); homeplace related to 
state programmes (for greater access to 
government resources allocated by village 
councils). 
Small Sites, Circulation Zone, 
Bangalore  
Homeplace related to state programmes (for 
greater access to government resources allocated 
by village councils). 
 
Mediation of Local Labour Control Regimes 
 
State Mediation 
Local labour control regimes are shaped by a variety of institutional mediations – primarily 
those of the state. Poulantzas (1978) suggests that the state can best be understood as a social 
relation, and as a product and mediator of all social relations. Any attempt to understand how 
pro-labouring class change might be routed through the capitalist state has to begin by trying 
to understand how ‘the class struggle, and especially political struggle and domination, are 
inscribed in the institutional structure of the state’, how the state is situated ‘vis-à-vis the field 
of struggle as a whole’ (Poulantzas 1978, 49, 125), and how its appropriation and distribution 
of resources mediates and shapes the capital-labour relation.  
 
Within worksites the potential for collective action is undermined by fragmentation, 
informality, precarity, the presence of a reserve army of labour, the cooption of some 
maistries, the lack of autonomy of others, and competition among them. Moving along the 
commodity chain from worksites was unlikely to be any more fruitful. The steel lobby and 
the sand (both coarser ‘M’ sand and finer river sand) and cement lobbies were hardly going 
to yield ground. Brick suppliers were mostly smaller-scale but still more powerful than petty 
contractors.21 Larger capital in the construction sector (both developers and builders), and 
associated industries like cement, wielded considerable political clout. Well represented by 
organisations like the Confederation of Real Estate Developers’ Associations of India 
(CREDAI), they could also generally count on the support of state-level legislators who had 
made their way into politics via the sector. Many politicians develop passing and long-term 
links to major developers and builders, and in 2017 two state ministers were said to be 
strongly linked to two of the largest developers and builders. 
                                                     
20 The settled workers living in formal housing (Yadgir colony) were mostly likely to act collectively 
in relation to the state (Municipal Corporation), as were the Tamil workers living in informal city 
settlements, but the latter were the least likely of all to act collectively. 
21 The small-scale village brick production sites visited during fieldwork were operated by petty 
village-based capitalists, while those in the city were subcontracted to intermediaries by larger 
capitalists.   
 
The power of capital within and beyond the sector, and the relative absence of worker 
contestation, contribute to the often high levels of profit in the construction sector (Levien 
2011, 458; interview, Bangalore, September 2017). More generally, and beyond these more 
direct state-capital links, the state mediates the capital-labour relation in the construction 
sector in various ways. It regulates land use, draws informal funding from suppliers of sand 
and steel, loosely regulates workplaces (or perhaps more accurately, largely abdicates from 
its regulatory responsibilities), provides a smattering of social security, and subsidises 
workers’ material reproduction in their home areas – primarily in the case of Karnataka 
through the Public Distribution System of subsidised foodgrains – while routinely denying 
migrant workers access to such programmes in destination areas.  
 
The state’s subsidising of part of labour’s reproduction costs through employment and other 
programmes has contradictory implications for the capital-labour relation. It helps to 
maintain social stability, allows capital to lower wages, and strengthens its ability to compete 
in the global marketplace. But if it goes too far, and labour becomes too independent of 
capitalists – as began to happen in certain places when the NREGS was at its peak in the 
early 2010s - then there is a potential for labour to make socio-economic and socio-political 
gains that recalibrate the capital-labour relation in its favour.  
 
From labour’s perspective such gains may be temporary and individualised, and develop new 
faultlines among classes of labour by subsuming them within competitive populist regimes 
(Vijayabaskar 2016), or local-level clientilism (Pattenden 2011). In Yadgir colony in 
Bangalore, antagonisms had long been focused on the state, and initially these centred on 
collective claims for services. From the time when the number of these migrant workers’ 
tents had swelled to the point when they were deemed to be a votebank by local politicians 
and given formal housing, claim-making had become increasingly individualised around 
Welfare Board grants and low-interest NGO loans. Tamil migrants living a few hundred 
metres away had not been so lucky. In the city for as long, their 25 rudimentary shacks meant 
that they were still few to be seen as a votebank, and in any case they were from a different 
state and spoke a different language. 
 
The state mediates unevenly, and often in ways that generate individualised rather than 
collective forms of action that can divide labour politically without providing any sustained 
material gain. But if material gains pass a certain point and re-work the balance of power they 
may be locked in, and provide a platform for extending class struggle back to the work arena. 
In other words collective action in relation to the state can be, but tends not to be, 
incrementally transformative. For now, though, the relationship between labourers’ struggles 
in the workplace and the ‘living space’ matters more than whether they are primarily 
expressed in one or the other arena.  
 
Given the horizontal and vertical fragmentation of the small-scale construction sector, the 
political weight of larger construction capital, and the complications of petty capitalist 
accumulation, the most likely avenue for collective action by informal construction workers 
remains the state – at least in the short-term until sporadic moves against big capital are 
underpinned by strengthening networks and a generalised upwards tilt in informal labour’s 
structural and associational power. South India’s largest construction union of recent decades 
(the TKTMS in Tamil Nadu), supported by networks like the National Centre for Labour, 
ended up going down this very path mobilising for a Welfare Board that was neither against 
the interests of contractor maistries, nor of a state trying to keep labour costs down while 
growing the country’s share of the global marketplace (interviews in Chennai and Bangalore, 
May 2016). And here, similarly to this paper’s findings, it was the masons, and especially 
those located in commuting zones in and around district towns, who led the way.  
 
Mediation by Labour Organisations 
The main actual and potential forms of collective action identified across this paper’s 
commuting and circulation zones related to wages and state welfare provisions (see Table 2). 
Besides occasional brief encounters between construction labourers working on small sites in 
Bangalore and unionists circulating information about the Welfare Board, none of the 
workers who are the subject of this paper had had any dealings with pro-labour organisations. 
Nevertheless, given that this paper seeks out possible routes to labour’s increased structural 
and associational power it is worth briefly outlining the activities pursued by pro-labour 
NGOs and unions who work with construction labourers. Brief mention will also be made of 
a recent mobilisation by garment workers - a detailed assessment would require analysis of 
relations between workers, intermediaries, managers and unions, and so the point here is 
simply to underline that informal workers do mobilise en masse, but more sporadically, and 
through less formal types of organisation. 
 
By employing north Indian workers who do not speak the state language, the strongest, and at 
the same time the most vulnerable sections of capital, made it harder for unions and NGOs in 
Bangalore to forge relationships with workers – already made difficult by the fact that 
workers on large sites lived behind security cordons. NGOs tended to work with construction 
workers who were settled in the city rather than migrant workers like the ones living in this 
paper’s circulation zone. Unions have used tactics such as the circulation of multi-language 
leaflets to reach such workers, but made very few inroads due to ‘worries about labour 
contractors and maistries’. Faced with such obstacles union activists have tried to reach 
workers through their home areas – both by visiting source villages, and by creating links 
with organisations working in those areas (interviews in Bangalore and Chennai, May 2016). 
For example, when a high-profile builder failed to pay workers’ wages in early 2016 the issue 
was pursued through links established between Bangalore-based unionists and an 
organisation in the workers’ home state of Jharkhand (interview, May 2016).22  
 
Welfare Board registration is the single most significant basis of NGO and Union 
organisation of construction workers. Some see it as a way of building up labour’s collective 
strength, and some see it as a means of building up their own strength. Others still see it as a 
way of making money through gatekeeping. Some unionists, though (generally those from 
independent unions or those associated with less established political parties), are less 
focused on maximising membership, and push back against fragmentation by emphasising 
workers’ shared position as members of the exploited classes. They encourage workers to 
analyse their conditions, and also try to develop labour’s awareness of its power by 
highlighting its fundamental role in generating the physical infrastructure that underpins 
India’s economic growth (interviews, Bangalore and Chennai, May 2016). Such strategies go 
alongside actions around wages and working conditions, attempts to challenge precarity 
                                                     
22 Such strategies resonate with calls in the literature for more emphasis on local trade unions, self-
organised workers’ groups, cross-organisational networks (Zajak et al. 2017, 899), ‘worker centre’-
based ‘local advocacy networks’ (Milkman 2010, 4), and a ‘social movement unionism’ that spans 
workplaces and living spaces, and links different antagonisms and spatial scales (Waterman 1993). 
 
through collective action and legal channels, and the development of networks of mutual 
support and coordination.  
 
As well as local and national networks, international allies have some role to play. Following 
pressure from Building and Woodworkers International, which has links to Indian 
construction unions, the Asian Development Bank has set the ILO’s core labour standards as 
conditions for the release of loans, and the International Finance Corporation has outlined 
similar conditions. Union networks have called for all building contracts to have worker 
components based on those same international principles, and national legislation provides 
additional points of potential leverage. Larger capital is the most vulnerable to such 
offensives, and also the most likely to implement regulations.  
 
In May 2016 the national government quite suddenly ruled that garment workers could not 
access the Provident Fund (a form of social security based on employer and employee 
contributions) until the age of 58. It thereby pushed out of reach the funds that could pay for a 
move away from a worksite, or for a family health crisis. The change restricted the freedom 
to exit and compromised household reproduction strategies. The mass mobilisation that 
followed in Bangalore was portrayed as ‘spontaneous’ (Shridar 2016), but among an 
estimated half million garment workers in the city around 5 per cent belonged to one of two 
independent unions, which were relatively well represented in the factory where the 
mobilisation began (interview, Bangalore, May 2016). In other words the mobilisation was 
not discrete from longer-term processes of conscientisation. In a sector with a rapid turnover 
of workers (CWM n.d., 40), and an absence of mass membership, smaller groupings of union 
activists showed their capacity to channel moments of intensified antagonism into a 
successful direct confrontation that gathered structural power not only from their own 
location in one of the state’s main export industries, but also from their physical proximity to 
the influential IT sector. When the garment workers poured out of their factories they closed 
down three of the city’s largest roads. With many IT workers unable to reach their offices, 
the risk of international ramifications pressed the government into a u-turn. 
 
The ability of a core of politicised workers to lie low as ‘latent associational power’ until 
moments when mobilisation becomes possible appears to be a key feature of the organisation 
of informal workers under late neoliberalism where fragmentation, precarity and the scarcity 
of work all undermine the capacity for sustained organisation. Forms of action inevitably 
have to diversify out from traditional patterns of unionism anchored in mass membership and 




Much of the recent literature on the organisation of informal labour has focused on where it 
has relatively more structural power. This paper has argued for a heightened focus on highly 
fragmented classes of labour with less structural power. It has combined analysis of 
workplace divisions, patterns of integration into capitalist accumulation, and spatial 
fragmentation across ‘reproduction zones’, and then sought out possible bases for unity and 
likely forms of collective action. In other words, it has tried to map actual and potential 
structural and associational power by analysing how local labour control regimes vary across 
reproduction zones. 
 
By comparing two contrasting reproduction zones the paper has highlighted the interrelations 
between different parts of the reproduction process and different moments of possible 
collective action. Within those reproduction zones, it has identified which groups along the 
continuum of informal classes of labour are more likely to mobilise, over what, where, and in 
relation to whom, and located that question on the broader terrain of the capital-labour 
relation in its more concrete and general forms. Worker unity, geographies of dependence on 
capital, the distribution of scarce skills, capital vulnerability, and the ‘positionality’ of 
maistries were all identified as important variables. The paper found pockets of actual and 
potential collective action among more skilled and less dependent workers, among somewhat 
less fragmented workers working on larger production sites for better-known employers, and 
with regards to state mediation of the capital-labour relation.  
 
Informality and the heightened temporal and spatial fragmentation of labouring class 
reproduction are reflected in forms of self-organisation that are sporadic and emerge from 
often submerged networks in workplaces and living spaces, and through interactions with 
more visible allies. Collective action by informal labour is uneven and limited in scope, but 
this does not mean that the politics of classes of labour are not dynamic, nor does it mean that 
research that is grounded in the concrete, and situated in the broader context of antagonistic 
capitalist development, will not identify trends and routes to scaling up, extending and 
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